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The protection of possession in Scots law 
Craig Anderson1 
 
A. INTRODUCTION: POSSESSION IN SCOTS LAW 
 
This paper is concerned with how possession is protected in Scots law. 
Most of the paper is concerned with one possessory remedy in particular, 
the so-called possessory judgment. To see how this fits into the law of 
possession more generally, we shall begin with an overview of the Scots 
law of possession. 
 Unlike the majority of civilian systems of property law, Scots law is 
not codified. Except where the law is governed by statute (and the law of 
possession is largely free from this), we look to the institutional writers of 
Scots law,2 especially Stair, and to the decisions of the courts. 
 When we look at the Scots law of possession, we find marked 
similarities to the Roman law.3 For example, we see in Roman law a 
distinction drawn between possession and ownership, Ulpian saying that 
the two have "nothing in common",4 with the result that possessory 
questions are not determined by asking who has the right to possess. 
Possession gives no right to possess beyond a right not to have that 
possession disturbed without consent or legal process. Certainly, it gives 
no rights against third party acquirers: the main possessory interdicts, 
utrubi for moveables5 and uti possidetis and unde vi for land,6 are not 
worded to give any right against third parties.7 Furthermore, Ulpian 
makes it clear that, if I acquire possession from one who got it forcibly, 
my possession is not thereby tainted.8  
                                       
1 Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University. The author has benefited from 
helpful comments by Professor George Gretton and Mr Scott Wortley, School of 
Law, University of Edinburgh, on a draft of this paper. Any errors remaining are 
the author's responsibility. 
2 The institutional writers are a small group of writers, writing between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, whose works are considered to be a formal 
source of law. In private law, the most important such works are Stair's 
Institutions, Erskine's Institute, Bankton's Institute and Bell's Principles and 
Commentaries. Craig's Jus Feudale is also sometimes included in the list. 
3 On the relationship between the Roman and Scots laws of possession, see 
further K Reid, ‘Property Law: Sources and Doctrine’ in K Reid & R Zimmermann 
(eds), A history of private law in Scotland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 
vols, 2000), pp 210-212. 
4 D.41.2.12.1. 
5 D.43.31.1pr. 
6 D.43.17.1pr (uti possidetis); D.43.16.1pr (unde vi). 
7 This must be qualified slightly for the interdict utrubi in the classical law, which 
gave possession to the party who had had possession for longest in the previous 
year, that possession not being vi clam aut precario. In theory, therefore, it could 
be used in appropriate circumstances to recover possession from someone other 
than the immediate dispossessor. In the law of Justinian, however, the interdict 
utrubi works in the same way as the interdict uti possidetis, awarding interim 
possession to the current possessor unless that possession was obtained from the 
other party vi clam aut precario: J Inst 4.15.4. 
8 D.43.17.3.10. 
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 We find the same approach in Scots law. Possession is "a distinct 
lesser right than property",9 giving "the right to continue it against all 
illegal contrary acts".10 In Scots law, possession is protected by the 
remedy of spuilzie,11 more commonly known as ejection12 when it relates 
to land.13 This gives the right, on being dispossessed without consent or 
order of the court, to be restored to possession pending consideration of 
the question of right: spoliatus ante omnia est restituendus.14 However, 
possession gives no right to possess beyond this, and the remedy is not 
available against third parties.15 
 In addition to the right not to have possession disturbed, in Roman 
law one possessing in good faith was entitled to the fruits of the 
property.16 We find the same in Scots law, Stair expressly drawing this 
rule from Roman law.17 
 In both, possession is said to require that two elements be present, 
one physical and one mental.18 
 In neither, and unlike some modern systems,19 is there any trace of 
any requirement to possess property for a particular length of time in 
                                       
9 Stair, Inst. 2.1.8. See also Erskine, Inst. 2.1.23; Bankton, Inst. 2.1.31 and 
4.24.50. 
10 Stair, Inst. 2.1.22. 
11 This is pronounced "spoolly". The z is silent. 
12 Or sometimes intrusion. The distinction between ejection and intrusion is that 
the former involves dispossession brought about by force, the latter being 
dispossession by stealth: Stair, Inst. 4.28.1. The rules governing these appear to 
be identical. 
13 Thus, Stair considers moveables and land separately, at Inst. 4.30 and 4.28 
respectively. See also Erskine, Inst. 4.1.15; Bankton, Inst. 2.1.31. The leading 
modern account of these possessory remedies is K G C Reid, The Law of Property 
in Scotland (Edinburgh: Law Society of Scotland/Butterworths, 1996) ("Reid, 
Property"), paras 161-166. See also W M Gordon & S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 
3rd edn (London: W Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 1, 2009), paras 14-11 - 14-39; 
D L Carey Miller with D Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn 
(Edinburgh: Thomson/W Green, 2005), paras 10.24-10.31;  D L Carey Miller, M M 
Combe, A J M Steven, S Wortley, "National Report on the Transfer of Movables in 
Scotland" in W Faber & B Lurger (eds), National Reports on the Transfer of 
Movables in Europe, Volume 2: England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Cyprus 
(Munich: Sellier, 2009) ("Scottish National Report"), para 2.4.2. 
14 Erskine, Inst. 4.1.15; Somerville v Hamilton (1541) Mor 14737; Men of Selkirk 
v Tenants of Kelso (1541) Mor 14378; Lady Renton v Her Son (1629) Mor 14739; 
Yeoman v Oliphant (1669) Mor 14740. 
15 Such at least is implied at Stair, Inst. 4.30.3. At Inst. 4.28.5, Stair gives a style 
summons of ejection which is aimed specifically at the dispossessor himself. It is 
true that at Inst. 1.9.16 he says that spuilzied property may be recovered from a 
third party acquirer, but he appears to be considering only the case where the 
property has been taken from its owner's possession. It is notable that this 
immediately follows a definition of spuilzie as a dispossession of an owner. This is 
also the situation in the case he refers to (Hay v Leonard (1677) Mor 10286). For 
discussion of this point, see D L Carey Miller with D Irvine, Corporeal Moveables 
in Scots Law, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: Thomson/W Green, 2005), para 10.28; Reid, 
Property, para 165. 
16 J Inst 2.1.35; Paul, D.41.1.48. 
17 Stair, Inst. 2.1.23. See also Erskine, Inst. 2.1.25-26; Bankton, Inst. 2.1.32. 
18 Paul, D.41.2.3.1; Stair, Inst. 2.1.17-18; Erskine, Inst. 2.1.20; Bankton, Inst. 
2.1.26, 29. 
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order to qualify for a possessory remedy. The exception to this is with 
possessory protection of the exercise of apparent servitudes in Roman 
law, where typically use is required to extend over a particular period of 
time. Thus, for example, one seeking an interdict to protect use of a 
servitude right of way would need to show that it had been used for thirty 
days in the current year.20 
Indeed, it is possible to overstress the similarities between the 
Roman and Scots laws of possession. Both Stair21 and Erskine22 adopt the 
Roman division of possessory remedies into those for obtaining, those for 
retaining and those for recovering possession.23 They are followed in this 
by a number of other authors,24 though it is notable that neither Stair nor 
Erskine actually identifies a possessory remedy for the obtaining of 
possession by one who has never possessed before. As Rankine points 
out,25 such a remedy is not possessory in the strict sense of being based 
on an individual's possession, and there is no trace of any such remedy in 
Scots law.26 
 More specifically, we may identify three key points of difference 
between the ways in which Scots and Roman law protect possession. 
 The first is that Scots law takes a broader view of the mental 
element of possession. There is no space here to explore the different 
views expressed in the nineteenth century by the German writers Savigny 
and Jhering on the mental element of the Roman law of possession,27 but 
suffice it to say that Roman law took a fairly restrictive view of the types 
of holder that possessed, and one could not determine those types 
according to any single, general principle. As with German law,28 however, 
                                                                                                             
19 See e.g. the French Code de procédure civile, art 1264, restricting possessory 
remedies in certain circumstances to those who have possessed for at least one 
year. 
20 Ulpian, D.43.19.1.2. See also e.g. Ulpian, D.43.20.1.4. 
21 Stair, Inst. 4.3.47. 
22 Erskine, Inst. 4.1.47. 
23 See G.4.143; J Inst 4.15.2. 
24 See e.g. A J G Mackay, The Practice of the Court of Session (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 2 vols, 1877-1879) (‘Mackay, Practice’), I,360 
25 J Rankine, A Treatise on the Rights and Burdens Incident to the Ownership of 
Lands and Other Heritages in Scotland, 4th edn (Edinburgh: W Green, 1909), 
("Rankine, Landownership"), p 8. 
26 Though see J Spotiswood (ed), Practical Observations upon Divers Titles of the 
Law of Scotland, Commonly Called Hope's Minor Practicks (Edinburgh: Davidson 
1734) (hereafter “Hope, Minor Practicks”), X.2. 
27 For Savigny, the mental element of possession "must consist in the intention of 
exercising ownership" (F K von Savigny, Possession, 6th edn, E Perry (trans) 
(London: S Sweet, 1848), p 72), with those cases where non-owners are viewed 
by Roman law as possessors being limited exceptions to this principle. Jhering, by 
contrast, denies the existence of a separate mental element beyond the 
consciousness of holding. Instead, In Jhering’s theory, a holder is presumed to be 
a possessor, unless exceptionally that party’s opponent can show that the holding 
is based on a causa detentionis, a ground of holding to which the law denies the 
protection of the possessory interdicts (R von Jhering, Besitzwille: zugleich eine 
Kritik der herrschenden juristischen Methode (Jena, 1889), pp 19-20). 
28 BGB, s 868. French law achieves the same effect by other means, namely the 
extension of possessory protection to certain holders falling outside the definition 
of possessor: Code de procédure civile, art. 1264. 
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Scots law extends possession to certain holders who hold partly on 
another's behalf. Scots law defines the mental element of possession as 
"the inclination or affection to make use of the thing detained".29 Thus, 
any holder of property intending to derive personal benefit from it is a 
possessor in Scots law. As a result, certain holders not considered to be 
possessors in Roman law are so considered in Scots law. The obvious 
example is a tenant or hirer of land or moveables. This is comparable to 
the definition given in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, which, after 
defining the category known as "owner-possessors",30 possession is then 
extended to those who hold: 
 
 (a) with the intention of doing so in that person's own interest, and 
 under a specific legal relationship with the owner-possessor which 
 gives the limited-right-possessor the right to possess the goods, or 
 
 (b) with the intention of doing so to the order of the owner-
 possessor and under a specific contractual relationship with the 
 owner-possessor which gives the limited-right-possessor a right to 
 retain the goods until any charges or costs have been paid by the 
 owner-possessor.31 
 
If we set aside the unfamiliar terminology of "owner-possessor" and 
"limited-right-possessor", and remember that one may hold partly on 
another's behalf on a non-contractual basis,32 this is a fair approximation 
to the Scottish position. 
 Secondly, we have seen that in Roman law one could only use the 
interdicts utrubi and uti possidetis to protect or recover possession if one 
had not obtained possession by force, stealth or precarium from the other 
party. No such rule exists in Scots law, where a possessor, even one in 
bad faith, is entitled not to be dispossessed, even by the owner of the 
property: 
 
a violent, clandestine, and unlawful possession may not be troubled 
though there be an evident right.33 
 
Thus, even a thief is entitled to retain his possession until his victim 
vindicates his right in the proper manner.34 
                                       
29 Stair, Inst. 2.1.17. See also Erskine's formulation at Inst. 2.1.20, where he 
requires "an animus or design in the detainer of holding it as his own property", 
which appears to require animus domini. However, at Inst. 2.1.22, he refers to 
pledgees, liferenters (usufructuaries) and tenants as possessing, possession 
arising "generally in every case where there are inferior rights affecting any 
subject distinct from the property of that subject". 
30 C von Bar & E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Munich: Sellier, 6 vols, 2009) 
("DCFR"), VIII.-I:206 (p 4327). 
31 DCFR, VIII.-I.207 (p 4353). 
32 An example would be a possessor who has improved another's property in 
good faith, holding the property as security for recompense for the 
improvements. See e.g. Binning v Brotherstones (1676) Mor 13401. 
33 Stair, Inst. 2.1.22. The same rule is given at Inst. 4.28.2. 
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 The third difference lies in the scope of the possessory remedies. 
Although they are classified as being for the retention of possession,35 
utrubi and uti possidetis could also be used for the recovery of possession. 
Spuilzie, by contrast, only allows for the recovery of possession.36 The 
normal Scots remedy "against a wrong in course of being done or against 
an apprehended violation of a party's rights"37 is known as interdict. On 
the basis of this definition of the scope of interdict, it would seem 
reasonable to suppose that it would be available to prevent the occurrence 
of a spuilzie. So indeed it is assumed by the authors of the Scottish 
national report on the transfer of moveables.38 Unfortunately, the point is 
lacking authority: all of the cases that they cite are in fact concerned with 
the protection of a possessor whose right of ownership is not in dispute.39 
It does not in fact appear that the rules governing interdict against 
dispossession are entirely in accord with those governing the restoration 
of possession following such dispossession. Thus, a party without any kind 
of written title may pursue for spuilzie of land (ejection) without having 
any kind of written title to the land;40 yet interdict , as we shall see below, 
would not have been available to such a possessor before the 
dispossession. It cannot therefore be safely assumed that an interdict 
would be available to prevent dispossession of moveable property without 
the possessor showing at least a prima facie case that he has a right in 
the property entitling him to possess. The only case where such a 
preventative remedy is certainly available on a purely possessory basis is 
that known as the possessory judgment. 
 
B. THE POSSESSORY JUDGMENT 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
We see then that Scots law protects a possessor, even one without a right 
to possess, against dispossession without consent or an order of the 
court. Such dispossession is known as spuilzie, and the remedy is for the 
court to order that possession be restored to the party dispossessed. 
What I want to focus on here is the other possessory remedy recognised 
by Scots law, the possessory judgment. While spuilzie does differ in 
various respects from the Roman possessory remedies, there are clearly 
common underlying principles, in particular the idea that one who is 
dispossessed without consent or proper legal process is entitled to be 
restored to possession pending resolution of the question of right. The 
                                                                                                             
34 There is an exception to this rule where one retakes possession immediately 
after the dispossession: Erskine, Inst. 2.1.23; Bell, Principles, s. 1319. Erskine's 
authority for this exception is Ulpian, D.43.16.3.9. 
35 J Inst 4.15.4. 
36 Thus, for example, Stair defines spuilzie as "obliging to restitution of the things 
taken away" (Inst. 1.9.16). 
37 S Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: Butterworths/Law 
Society of Scotland, 1994) ("Scott Robinson, Interdict"), p 1. 
38 Scottish National Report, para 2.4.3. 
39 Wilson v Shepherd 1913 SC 300; Leitch & Co Ltd v Leydon 1930 SC 41, 
affirmed 1931 SC (HL) 1; Phestos Shipping Co Ltd v Kurmiawan 1983 SC 165; 
Shell UK Ltd v McGillivray 1991 SLT 667. 
40 Stair, Inst. 4.28.2. 
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possessory judgment does not appear to have such a strong similarity to 
the Roman possessory remedies. In general terms, the possessory 
judgment operates to protect possession that has been exercised for 
seven years on a written title apparently sufficient to support it. While this 
overlaps with spuilzie and ejection, in that it does allow the recovery of 
possession that has been lost, it also allows one entitled to it to go to 
court to obtain an order that existing possession not be interfered with.41 
Unlike spuilzie and ejection, there is nothing to indicate that the 
possessory judgment is available only against the actual dispossessor. 
Despite the lack of similarity between them, the possessory 
judgment has sometimes been said to be derived from the Roman 
possessory interdicts.42 Indeed, in at least two cases, Court of Session 
judges have taken the Roman interdict uti possidetis to be synonymous 
with the possessory judgment.43 Alternatively, Bankton makes a 
comparison between the possessory judgment and the actio Publiciana,44 
which gave allowed possessors in certain circumstances to recover or 
defend their possession as if they were owners.45 It is true that a number 
of legal systems have received the actio Publiciana in modified form.46 
However, there is no further evidence for its reception in Scots law, and 
Bankton himself does not claim any historical connection, noting only the 
existence of "some resemblance" between the possessory judgment and 
the actio Publiciana. 
An alternative view is put forward by the institutional writers.47 
According to this view, the reason for the existence of the possessory 
judgment is twofold. The first part of this is the existence, until its 
abolition just a few years ago, of the feudal system of land tenure.48 
Because of this, no-one (except the Crown, in the case of Crown lands) 
owned land outright. Instead, the land was held by the vassal of a 
superior, who had a continuing interest in the land. The second part is the 
importance in Scots law of written titles to land. In Scots law, no-one may 
acquire ownership of land without some kind of written deed in his favour. 
This differs from some other systems, where, for example, one may 
acquire ownership by positive prescription by simply possessing in the 
                                       
41 Rankine, Landownership, p. 13. 
42 D M Walker, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green, 
1974) ("Walker, Civil Remedies"), p 250; H Burn-Murdoch, Interdict in the Law of 
Scotland with a Chapter on Specific Performance (1933, reprinted Collieston, 
Caledonian Books, 1986) ("Burn-Murdoch, Interdict"), para 87; Mackay, Practice, 
I,360. 
43 Colquhoun v Paton (1859) 21 D 996, 1001 (per Lord Cowan); Maxwell v 
Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co (1866) 4 M 447, 456 (per Lord Deas). 
See also Hume v Scot (1676) Mor 10644, in which reference was also made to 
the interdict uti possidetis. 
44 Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33. 
45 For discussion, see W W Buckland, A Text-book of Roman Law from Augustus 
to Justinian, 3rd edn, revd P Stein (Cambridge: University Press, 1975) pp. 191-
5. 
46 DCFR, pp. 5276-8 and 5286-92. 
47 Stair, Inst. 4.22.14, 4.26.3; Erskine, Inst. 4.1.50; Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33. See 
also Winton v Gordon (1668) Mor 10627 
48 Abolished by the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000, s 1, which 
came into force on 28th November, 2004. 
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required manner for a given period.49 In Scots law, for positive 
prescription to operate, the possession must follow the registration of a 
written title.50 The need for a written title meant that, in a dispute over 
title to an area of land, the deeds relating to the land would need to be 
produced. However, some of the deeds needed by the vassal to prove his 
right would often also be needed by the superior to prove his right, and so 
would be retained in the superior's hands. To meet this difficulty, the 
possessory judgment allowed the current possessor, on meeting certain 
requirements, to defend that possession in the interim, until he could lay 
hands on the deeds necessary to prove his right. This does appear to be a 
plausible explanation of the origin of the remedy, although, if it is correct, 
it is surprising that Craig does not mention it in his Jus Feudale, even in 
his discussion of the recovery of possession.51 
The possessory judgment, as we shall see, operates to protect 
possession of land, and also protects the exercise of apparent rights in 
land, such as servitudes, public rights of way and leases. However, it does 
not extend to moveable property, possession of which is protected only 
using the remedies already mentioned above.52 
 
(2) Possessory nature 
 
The possessory judgment is genuinely possessory in that it does not 
determine and is not determined by the question of actual right.53 
Instead, its purpose is to preserve the established state of possession 
until it can be determined where the right lies. Accordingly, the outcome 
of proceedings for a possessory judgment cannot be taken to determine 
the question of right. As with the law of Justinian,54 the possessory 
proceedings merely determine who will have to raise the action to 
determine the question of right. They are not themselves res judicata on 
the question of right.55 In numerous cases, the courts have made it clear 
that the question of right is reserved for later proceedings.56 A possessory 
judgment will even be available when the invalidity of the possessor's title 
is apparent from the known facts. Thus, in Porterfield v M'Millan,57 a 
                                       
49 For example, in South Africa, the relevant legislation (Prescription Act 68 of 
1969, s 1) does not require registration to begin prescription. Registration will 
follow the prescriptive acquisition of ownership (P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar & H 
Mostert, Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property, 5th edn (Durban: 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006), para 8.6.8. In Germany, acquisition is by 
registration following thirty years’ possession (BGB, s 927). 
50 The current law on this point is to be found in the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973, s. 1(1). 
51 Craig, Jus Feudale, 2.8.2 and 2.9. At 2.7.27, he says that one who has 
possessed on an apparent title for a year and a day is entitled to be treated as 
rightful possessor "until the question of the real state of rights has been brought 
before the court and determined" (taken from the translation the Jus Feudale by J 
A Clyde (Edinburgh: W Hodge, 1934). 
52 Reid, Property, para 116. 
53 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, para 87; Rankine, Landownership p. 12; Reid, 
Property, para 145; Walker, Civil Remedies, p 252. 
54 J Inst 4.15.4. 
55 Hope, Minor Practicks, X.1 (Spotiswood's note). 
56 See e.g. Macdonald v Watson (1830) 8 S 584; Ker v Pringle (1662) Mor 10619 
57 (1847) 9 D 1424. 
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possessory judgment was sought to protect the use of an apparent 
servitude of pasturage over an area of grazing land owned in common by 
two neighbouring proprietors. One of these parties was the pursuer, who 
had previously begun proceedings to have the grazing land divided 
between the co-owners. These proceedings had, however, been allowed to 
lapse. In the meantime, the other co-owner had sold part of his own land, 
granting with it a servitude of pasturage over the grazing land, the extent 
of the servitude right to be determined when the grazing land was 
divided. This land then came into the hands of the defender in the present 
case. The court considered itself bound to grant the defender a possessory 
judgment on the basis of use for the required period, even though, on the 
facts available to the court, the servitude was void as being partially a non 
domino.58 This is a rather extreme example, and the court was perhaps 
influenced by the argument that the pursuer should not benefit from his 
own failure to insist in the action for division, that being the cause of the 
servitude's invalidity, but it illustrates the present point. 
 This being the case, the decision in M'Kerron v Gordon59 seems 
questionable. That case concerned a claim for a possessory judgment to 
protect the use of a former road across private land as a public right of 
way. The majority of the Inner House of the Court of Session rejected the 
claim, on the basis that the use made was unlawful in origin, the original 
public road having been shut up some sixty years previously by statutory 
procedure. 
 It was questioned in that case whether it was permissible to look 
back beyond the seven years' possession required for the possessory 
judgment. The lead opinion was by Lord Ormidale, who expressed his 
view in this way: 
 
 it would be quite competent for the party resisting a possessory 
 judgment to shew that the possession relied on in support of it had 
 been the result of violence, intimidation or other illegal acts; in 
 short, that in place of it having been of a character to indicate that 
 it took place in the exercise of a right, it was truly in persistence of 
 a wrong. 
 
He went on to hold that the initial illegality of the possession tainted the 
whole of the use made, with the result that it was not possible to establish 
the required standard of possession thereafter. We shall see below that 
violence in taking possession is a fatal defect in a claim for a possessory 
judgment, and Lord Ormidale appears to take the view that the reason for 
this is that it implies an absence of right. However, strictly speaking, the 
fact that I took possession through violence or intimidation has nothing to 
do with whether I have a right to possess. I may do this in full belief of 
my right. In and of itself, the fact that I took possession through force 
means only that my taking possession was opposed. It does not mean, or 
                                       
58 A servitude may not be validly granted by a co-owner acting alone. See e.g. 
Grant v Heriot's Trust (1906) 8 F 647; WVS Office Premises Ltd v Currie 1969 SC 
170; Fearnan Partnership v Grindlay 1990 SLT 704, affirmed on different grounds 
at 1992 SC (HL) 38. As Reid points out (Reid, Property, para 28), this is an 
application of the general rule that nemo dat quod non habet. 
59 (1876) 3 R 429. 
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even imply, that the person opposing my entry was entitled to do so. 
Instead, sufficient reason to deny me the protection of the possessory 
judgment lies in the argument that one who does justice at his own hand 
should be denied any benefit from doing so.60 
 There seems indeed to be no justification for Lord Ormidale's 
approach in generalising the rule against protecting violently obtained 
possession into a rule denying the protection of the possessory judgment 
to any unlawful possession. Given that possessory proceedings are 
concerned with awarding interim possession until the question of right can 
be enquired into, it is inevitable that sometimes possession will be 
protected that turns out to be unlawful in the sense of not being based on 
any right to possess. Lord Gifford, in his dissenting opinion, observes: 
 
 It is true that in determining as to the proof of possession it is 
 competent for the parties, and competent for the Court, to go 
 farther back than seven years, - indeed to go back as far as is 
 necessary. But the object of so going back is not to ascertain the 
 question of right, but merely to ascertain the character of the 
 possession, - that is, to ascertain whether the possessors claimed 
 to possess as matter of right, or whether they did so by special 
 permission or sufferance...The sheriff cannot ask [in possessory 
 proceedings], and cannot decide,[61] whether they were right or 
 wrong in making the claim. To go back beyond the seven years, in 
 order to ascertain whether there actually existed a permanent right 
 or not, would be to obliterate the distinction between a possessory 
 question and a question of permanent heritable right.62 
 
Lord Gifford's view appears to be more consistent with the nature of 
possessory remedies, and also with the other authorities referred to 
above. 
 If it is not necessary to prove the validity of one's own right in order 
to obtain a possessory judgment, no more is it necessary to prove the 
validity of the right of the party from whom one obtained title. Thus, in 
Hume v Scot,63 where a tenant sought the benefit of a possessory 
judgment, there was no need for proof of the title of the grantor of the 
lease. 
 
(3) The need for title 
 
No-one, except for the Crown, can own land in Scotland without some 
form of written title. Accordingly, while a possessory judgment cannot 
determine the question of right, equally it is reasonable to refuse even an 
                                       
60 For Stair, it is "the main foundation of the peace, and preservation thereof, that 
possession may not be recovered by violence, but by order of law". (Inst. 
2.1.22). See also Erskine, Inst. 2.1.23. The idea that the protection of possession 
is based on the law's opposition to violence is also found later in Savigny, 
Possession, p 6. 
61 Jurisdiction in questions of rights in heritable property (i.e. land and rights 
relating to land) was subsequently given to the Sheriff Court in terms of the 
Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, s 5(4). 
62 (1876) 3 R 429 at 437. 
63 (1676) Mor 10641. 
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interim remedy to one who it is plain has no prospect of proving right. 
Accordingly, the possession sought to be protected by a possessory 
judgment must be based on a written title.64 This title must be one 
ostensibly giving a right to possession. Thus, in Cant v Aickman,65 a right 
of annualrent66 was found not to be sufficient basis for a possessory 
judgment concerning possession of the land itself. The title must, so far as 
appears on its face, be valid and apply to the property or right sought to 
be protected.67 Accordingly, a title which has an invalidity patent on its 
face will not be sufficient foundation for a possessory judgment.68 
However, as we have seen, it is not necessary for the title actually to be 
valid.  
It appears that, at an earlier period, this title had to be completed 
by infeftment.69 Indeed, even after Stair, Spotiswood was still giving as 
the law a requirement for title to have been completed by infeftment.70 
However, this rule has long since been departed from. In Glendinning v 
Gordon,71 a title was accepted as sufficient foundation for a possessory 
judgment even without sasine. In Knox v Brand and Berry,72 a possessory 
judgment was given based on possession from the date of the charter 
apparently granting the right rather than from the date of infeftment. 
 It is not only apparent owners of land that are protected by the 
possessory judgment. A lease is sufficient foundation for a possessory 
judgment,73 including a dispute over right of access, apparently exercised 
as a pertinent to the lease, over neighbouring ground.74 The same applies 
                                       
64 Bridges v Elder (1822) 1 S 373. 
65 (1683) Mor 10633. 
66 This is a type of payment obligation contained in the title to land. See Stair, 
Inst. 2.5. 
67 Stair, Inst. 2.3.73; Bankton, Inst. 4.24.55; Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, para 89; 
Rankine, Landownership, p 9; Reid, Property, para 146; W M Gordon & S 
Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn (London: W Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 1, 
2009), para 14-18; T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland 
(Edinburgh: W Green, 1962), p 466. 
68 Watson v Shields 1996 SCLR 81. 
69 Mackay, Practice, I,200 (b); Stair, Inst. 4.26.3; Erskine, Inst. 4.1.50; 
Johnstone v Erskine (1668) Mor 10621; Baird v Law (1695) Mor 10623. 
Infeftment means entry of the vassal with the superior: Reid, Property, para 93 
(Gretton). From 1874 until the abolition of feudal tenure in 2004, it was deemed 
to occur on recording of the conveyance in the vassal's favour in the Register of 
Sasines or its registration in the Land Register: Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 
1874, s 4(2) (now repealed). 
70 See his note to Hope, Minor Practicks, X.1. 
71 (1716) Mor 10610. 
72 (1827) 5 S 666. 
73 Erskine, Inst. 2.6.28, 4.1.50; Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33; Hume v Scot (1676) Mor 
10641; Hepburn v Robertson (1706) Mor 10644; St Andrews Ladies' Golf Club v 
Denham (1887) 14 R 686; Innes v Allardyce (1822) 2 S 93. Note that a lease 
can, in certain circumstances, be made a real right in Scots law. 
74 M'Donald v Dempster (1871) 10 M 94; Galloway v Cowden (1885) 12 R 578; 
Little v Irving (unreported, 25.1.2000, Dumfries Sheriff Court). The court's 
opinion in the last of these cases is reproduced in R R M Paisley & D J Cusine, 
Unreported Property Cases from the Sheriff Courts (Edinburgh: W Green, 2000), 
p 120. 
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to liferenters.75 According to the definition of possession noted earlier, 
these parties are possessors and so are, reasonably enough, protected as 
such. 
We see, then, that the possessory judgment can be used to protect 
those whose possession is based on apparent rights other than ownership. 
In fact, despite controversy over whether incorporeal property can 
properly said to be capable of being possessed,76 the possessory 
judgment can be used to regulate use of land more generally. Despite 
early authority to the contrary,77 the exercise of apparent rights in land 
can be regulated by the possessory judgment, for example servitudes78 
and public rights of way.79 Hunter v Maule80 was concerned with a right to 
fish for salmon, which in Scots law may be owned separately from the 
land itself.81 Loch v Lockie82 was concerned with a right of annualrent. 
Knox v Brand and Berry83 was concerned with a right of ferry. 
 The need for a written title means that one coming to court without 
such a title will not be entitled to a possessory judgment.84 An example of 
this can be found in Neilson v Vallance,85 in which a dispute between two 
neighbours over an area of garden ground was resolved by a finding that 
the possession of the neighbour whose occupation was challenged was not 
supported by the parties' respective titles. Again, in Hunter v Maule,86 a 
possessory judgment in relation to salmon fishing rights was denied on 
the basis that the title relied on had not been produced. By the same 
token, if the written title is so unclear that it cannot be determined from 
its face what it includes, the possessory judgment will not be available. 
Instead, it will be necessary to proceed straight to the question of title.87 
 May a title form the foundation of a possessory judgment if it has 
been reduced (i.e. set aside by the court), or the question of right has 
                                       
75 Stair, Inst. 4.22.8. 
76 The majority view in Scots law seems to be that incorporeal property is not 
capable of being possessed. See e.g. Craig, Jus Feudale, 2.7.3; Stair, Inst. 2.7.3; 
Reid, Property, para 120; D J Cusine & R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of 
Way (Edinburgh: W Green, 1998) ("Cusine & Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of 
Way"), para 1.70; Scottish National Report, para 2.1.3(c). Bankton is prepared to 
go only as far as recognising "a kind of possession" of incorporeals (Inst. 2.1.28). 
Compare D J Carr, Possession in Scots Law: Selected Themes (unpublished MSc 
thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2005), p 60. The same dispute exists in other 
systems: see the papers in this volume by Duard Kleyn and Thomas Rüfner. 
77 Grant v Law (1695) Mor 10644. 
78 Stair, Inst. 2.7.22, 4.17.2; Stewart v Grant (1698) Mor 10644; Carson, Warren 
& Co v Miller (1863) 1 M 604; Liston v Galloway (1835) 14 S 97; Porterfield v 
M'Millan (1847) 9 D 1424; Drummond v Milligan (1890) 17 R 316. 
79 Macdonald v Watson (1830) 8 S 584; Calder v Adam (1870) 8 M 645; M'Kerron 
v Gordon (1876) 3 R 429. 
80 (1827) 5 S 238. 
81 Reid, Property, para 210. 
82 (1628) Mor 10637. Unlike Cant v Aickman, referred to above, this case was 
concerned with exercise of the right of annualrent rather than possession of the 
land itself. 
83 (1827) 5 S 714. 
84 Rankine, Landownership, p 10. 
85 (1828) 7 S 182 
86 (1827) 5 S 238. 
87 Cruickshank v Irving (1854) 17 D 286. 
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been considered in earlier proceedings? It appears not: In Montgomery v 
Home88 a possessory judgment was refused even though there had been 
seven years' further possession following a decree of removing, and in 
Anderson v Forbes89 it was held that there could be no possessory 
judgment on the basis of a title that had been reduced. Again, this was 
the outcome even with seven years' further possession. In Lockhart v 
Meikle,90 a possessory judgment was denied where it was sought in the 
face of a decree declaring title. These decisions are consistent with Stair's 
view91 that, where there has been a declaratory action, no defence may 
then be put forward in a possessory action that could have been put 
forward in the declaratory action. Where the question of right is res 
judicata between two parties, the possessory question is superseded. This 
also explains the different outcome in Innes v Allardyce,92 in which a lease 
was held sufficient title for an interdict against interference with 
possession by parties other than the landlord, even though the lease had 
been reduced: although the question of the right to possess had been 
settled between landlord and tenant, it was not res judicata against third 
parties. Even though this case was concerned with a normal interdict, 
rather than a possessory judgment, there seems to be no good reason for 
distinguishing the case on this ground. 
 
(4) Rights not requiring writing 
 
It was noted earlier that the possessory judgment required that some 
form of written title be produced that was at least ex facie sufficient to 
give a right to possess the property. The reason for this was said to be 
that such a title is a sine qua non for the acquisition of ownership and 
that, accordingly, there was no purpose in allowing interim protection to 
someone with no chance of proving a right. However, not all rights in land 
require writing for their constitution. Can someone using land as if by one 
of those rights obtain a possessory judgment to protect that use? It 
appears that this is permissible, and that a written title is only required of 
someone claiming to possess on the basis of a right requiring writing for 
its acquisition.  Public rights of way, for example, may be created in 
writing93 but invariably are constituted instead by prescriptive 
possession.94 For this reason, the courts have held that no written title is 
required when a possessory judgment is sought to protect the exercise of 
an apparent public right of way.95 Again, possession on the basis of a 
statutory provision has been held capable of protection by a possessory 
judgment. Thus, in Richmond v Inglis,96 a party on whom the 
                                       
88 (1664) Mor 10627. 
89 (1696) Mor 10630. 
90 (1724) Mor 10625. 
91 Stair, Inst. 4.3.47. 
92 (1822) 2 S 93. 
93 Reid, Property, para 498. 
94 In terms of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 3(3). 
95 Macdonald v Watson (1830) 8 S 584; Calder v Adam (1870) 8 M 645; M'Kerron 
v Gordon (1876) 3 R 429 at 433, per Lord Ormidale. 
96 (1842) 4 D 769. See also Maxwell v Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co 
(1866) 4 M 447, especially per Lord Deas at 454; Boyd v Kirkcudbright CC 1937 
SLT (Sh Ct) 17. 
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responsibility for maintenance of a street had been imposed by statute 
was held entitled to a possessory judgment in defence of the public's 
possession, against an owner of land adjoining the street claiming to have 
title to part of the land occupied as a street. The latter was ordered to 
remove a fence that he had constructed, until the question of right was 
settled. 
 We have seen that possession on the basis of an apparent lease is 
protected by the possessory judgment. Most leases will be constituted in 
writing. However, a lease with a term not exceeding one year may be 
constituted orally97 (although, in practice, writing will still normally be 
used). As we shall see in a moment, the possessory judgment requires 
the longer period of seven years' possession, from which it may be 
supposed that the issue cannot arise. However, a lease will be 
automatically renewed by the doctrine of tacit relocation if notice is not 
given terminating it,98 with the result that a lease initially for a year or 
less may in fact last for a much longer period. The only writer to consider 
the relevance of the length of the lease does not give a concluded view on 
the matter, saying only that a lease is sufficient title for a possessory 
judgment "at least where the tack [i.e. the lease] has a longer duration 
than seven years".99 Unfortunately, though, none of the authorities that 
he cites bear on the present question. However, if it is accurate to say (as 
it appears to be) that writing is only required for the possessory judgment 
where writing is required for the acquisition of the right, there seems to 
be no reason to distinguish an orally-created lease of a term of no more 
than a year from other rights created without writing. On this basis, it is 
suggested here that such a lease, which has in fact endured for the 
required period of possession, provides sufficient title for a possessory 
judgment. Given that the law allows the term of a lease to be tacitly 
extended, without the constitution of a new lease, there seems to be no 
reason to distinguish between a lease initially granted for a term 
exceeding seven years and a lease granted for a shorter term but which 
has been extended by tacit relocation. 
 One claiming a servitude will always have a written title, at least to 
the benefited property, given that only an owner of land may hold the real 
right of servitude over neighbouring land.100 A servitude itself, however, 
need not be constituted in writing.101 Scott Robinson suggests that, in 
such a case, a written title to the benefited property will be sufficient.102 
Unfortunately, both of the cases cited by him as authority are in fact 
                                       
97 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1(7), creating an exception to 
the requirement in s 1(2)(b) for writing in the creation of a real right in land. 
98 For discussion, see J Rankine, A Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland, 3rd 
edn (Edinburgh: W Green, 1916), pp 598-602; G C H Paton, The Law of Landlord 
and Tenant in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green, 1967), pp 221-227. 
99 J R Dickson, "Possessory Actions" in Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland (vol 
11, 1931) ("Dickson, Possessory Actions"), para 1189. The additional requirement 
that he states, that the lease "bears to flow from the heritable proprietor", may 
be rejected insofar as it appears to raise the question of who the proprietor is 
runs counter to the possessory nature of the remedy. 
100 See e.g. Cusine & Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way, para 1.37. 
101 Thus, for example, a servitude may be created by positive prescription without 
any writing: Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 3(2). 
102 Scott Robinson, Interdict, p 14. 
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concerned with public rights of way,103 although in one of these cases, 
Calder v Adam,104 the rule for possessory protection of apparent 
servitudes was implied obiter by Lords Benholme and Neaves105 to be in 
accordance with Scott Robinson's view. In fact, though, there is a division 
in the caselaw on the point. In Liston v Galloway,106 a possessory 
judgment was allowed to protect the exercise of an apparent servitude by 
a party over neighbouring ground, even though her title made no 
reference to a servitude. On the other hand, in Carson, Warren & Co v 
Miller,107 the Lord Justice-Clerk stated matters thus: 
 
 It is quite true that a servitude right may be acquired by 
 possession for forty years without a title. But seven years' 
 possession will not enable a party to obtain a possessory judgment, 
 unless it be supported by something in the shape of a title.108 
 
In this case, the owner of an area of ground sought a possessory 
judgment to prevent the blocking of a nearby street. Unfortunately, the 
Lord Justice-Clerk did not refer to Liston v Galloway (or indeed to any 
authority at all on this point), and it is difficult to reconcile the two cases. 
Curiously, only seven years before Calder v Adam, Lords Benholme and 
Neaves both concurred in the decision in this case. In the Outer House, 
the Lord Ordinary did attempt to distinguish Liston. His grounds for doing 
so are not clear, but seem to be derived from the fact that, while in Liston 
the path was an obvious one leading up to a gate in the pursuer's wall, in 
Carson, Warren & Co v Miller the land over which the servitude was 
claimed was a street not even adjacent to the supposed benefited 
property. The decision would perhaps, therefore, have been better 
founded on a lack of possession, in other words that  the use made of the 
nearby street was not made in the manner of someone exercising a 
servitude. In any case, though, the Lord Justice-Clerk's view seems 
difficult to justify in principle, given the authority to the effect that a 
written title is only required for a possessory judgment if such a title is 
actually required for the constitution of the right. 
 
(5) Possession 
 
In addition to a written title, one seeking a possessory judgment must 
also have possessed for a certain length of time. Where the current 
possessor has not possessed for the required length of time, it is 
permitted to add together the possession of consecutive possessors.109 
This has been held to be so even where the previous possessor was not a 
predecessor in title, but the loser in a competition of titles with the party 
who then took over possession. The latter was then held entitled to add 
                                       
103 Calder v Adam (1870) 8 M 645; M'Kerron v Gordon (1876) 3 R 429. 
104 (1870) 8 M 645. 
105 (1870) 8 M 645 at 648. 
106 (1835) 14 S 97. 
107 (1863) 1 M 604. 
108 (1863) 1 M 604 at 611. 
109 Hope, Minor Practicks, X.1; Stair, Inst. 4.22.8, 4.22.14. Erskine, Inst. 4.1.49; 
Galloway v Cowden (1885) 12 R 578. 
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the prior possessor's possession to her own in order to reach the required 
period of possession.110 There does, however, appear to be an exception 
to this where the dispute is between the current and previous possessors. 
In Matheson v Stewart,111 one party had bought part of a larger estate 
from the other. It was disputed whether an area of which the purchaser 
took possession was in fact included in the sale. The purchaser's 
argument that he should be entitled to a possessory judgment based on 
the seller's possession, added to his own, was given short shrift by the 
court. 
At an earlier period, the period of possession required for the 
possessory judgment was ten years.112 During the seventeenth century, 
however, there seems to have been some doubt about the appropriate 
period of possession to qualify for the possessory judgment. In Fuird v 
Stevenson,113 a period of six years was accepted as sufficient. However, in 
Hamilton v Tenants of Oversheils,114 the court expressly stated that seven 
years was the required period. Stair follows this view,115 which is now 
universally recognised as correct.116 More precisely, the requirement is 
seven years of possession, followed by no more than seven years of non-
possession,117 allowing the possessory judgment to be used, not just for 
the protection of possession, but also for its recovery.  
This rather seems to overlap with the normal possessory remedies 
outlined earlier, and we shall return to this point later on. However, it is 
established in the caselaw. Thus, for example, in Dalmahoy v 
Horsburgh,118 the pursuer raised an action for mails and duties119 as heir 
to her brother, who had been in possession for ten years up to his death 
in 1623. In proceedings for a possessory judgment, this was preferred to 
the defender's possession for the subsequent five years. Again, in Maxwell 
v Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co,120 the pursuer sought the 
removal of certain works established on his land by the defenders for 
railway purposes either thirteen or sixteen years previously. It was 
assumed by the court that, had the railway company not had possession 
                                       
110 Drummond v Milligan (1890) 17 R 316. 
111 (1872) 10 M 704. 
112 Rankine, Landownership, p. 11; Hope, Minor Practicks, 10.1; P G B McNeill 
(ed), The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich (Stair Society volumes 21-
22, 1962-3), 31.1; Provinciall of the Blackfriars v Bervick (1503) Mor 10597; 
Stuart v Lundie (1632) Mor 10617. 
113 (1637) Mor 10618. 
114 (1661) Mor 10618. 
115 Stair, Inst. 2.3.73, 4.26.4, 4.26.10(7). 
116 Erskine, Inst. 4.1.49-50; Bankton, Inst. 4.24.55; Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, 
para 90; Mackay, Practice, I,200; Rankine, Landownership, p. 12; W M Gordon & 
S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn (London: W Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 
1, 2009), para 14-18; Walker, Civil Remedies, p 251; Reid, Property, para 146; T 
B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green, 
1962), p 466; Watt v Maitland Macgill (1823) 2 S 289. 
117 Stair, Inst. 4.26.4, 4.26.10(7); Erskine, Inst. 4.1.49. 
118 (1628) Mor Supp 55. 
119 An action for mails and duties is an action for the rents of lands. 
120 (1866) 4 M 447. 
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for more than seven years, the pursuer would have been entitled to be 
restored to possession until the railway company proved its right.121  
Wilson v Henderson122 is sometimes cited as authority for the same 
proposition.123 In that case, attempts made over a period of five years to 
stop use of a road by challenging users and obstructing and ploughing up 
the road were held not to bar a possessory judgment to protect that use, 
where that use had been carried on for many years before that. However, 
it seems that the attempts to stop use of the road were unsuccessful. 
Accordingly, this is not a case of the possessory judgment being used to 
recover possession within seven years of its loss. However, the point is 
sufficiently made by Dalmahoy v Horsburgh and Maxwell v Glasgow and 
South-Western Railway Co. 
 
(6) Standard of possession required 
 
It is not enough simply to possess for the required period. One must 
possess in a particular manner. This has been said to be the manner 
required for acquisition of a right in land by positive prescription,124 which, 
according to the present law, is possession that is held "for a continuous 
period...openly, peaceably and without any judicial interruption".125 Thus 
the requirement has been said variously to be "peaceable possession",126 
"peaceful and uninterrupted" possession,127 possession that is 
"continuous, without violence, not clandestine, not precarious and not 
unlawful"128 and possession that is "open, peaceful and exercised as a 
matter of right".129 Bankton, following Roman law,130 requires possession 
that is not acquired by force, stealth or licence.131 In Calder v Adam,132 
Lord Benholme observed that there could be no possessory judgment 
where the possession was "precarious, or violent", or where there was 
some other vice. In Maxwel v Ferguson,133 it was held that the possessory 
judgment could not be founded on possession that was acquired by force 
or stealth. Burn Murdoch states the requirement as possession that is 
"peaceful, lawful and uninterrupted",134 drawing the second of these from 
                                       
121 (1866) 4 M 447, at 452 (per the Lord President), 454 (per Lord Deas) and 456 
(per Lord Ardmillan). 
122 (1855) 17 D 534. 
123 See Rankine, Landownership, p 12; Dickson, Possessory Actions para 1192. 
124 Reid, Property, para 146; Dickson, Possessory Actions, para 1192. 
125 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, ss 1(1), 2(1)(a) and 3(1)(a) 
and (3). The period in question is ten years for the acquisition of ownership (s 1) 
and twenty years for other real rights in land. 
126 Erskine, Inst. 2.1.28. 
127 W M Gordon & S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn (London: W 
Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 1, 2009), para 14-21. 
128 Cusine & Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way, paras 16.19 and 23.09. 
129 Walker, Civil Remedies, p 251. 
130 Ulpian, D.43.17.1pr (interdict uti possidetis); D.43.31.1 (interdict utrubi). 
131 Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33. 
132 (1870) 8 M 645 at 648. 
133 (1673) Mor 10628. 
134 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, para 90. 
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the decision in M'Kerron v Gordon,135 which was suggested above to be 
wrongly decided. 
 None of this is very precise, but the general idea seems to be that 
the possessor has done so without any occurrence that could be 
characterised as a challenge to the right to possess, as for example where 
the possession was only attained through force. 
 The only dissent from this comes from Stair, who holds that the 
possessory judgment "will not be elided by an allegeance of its being 
clandestine, or having a vicious entry".136 However, in light of the 
foregoing, it may be said that this has not been accepted as the law.  
   
(7) Is good faith required? 
 
It is inevitable that a possessory remedy, being based on possession 
rather than right, will on occasion protect someone whose possession is 
not in fact legally justified. Does it, however, make any difference whether 
the possessor knows that his possession is not legally justified? In other 
words, is there a requirement for good faith? Not all writers on the 
possessory judgment address this issue at all, and sometimes it is done 
only ambiguously. Thus, Rankine notes that the holder of a possessory 
judgment has the rights of a bona fide possessor,137 but this could mean 
either that he was in good faith from the beginning of his possession or 
that he is only deemed to be in good faith from the granting of the 
possessory judgment. The same is true of Walker's statement that a party 
obtaining a possessory judgment is "entitled to be considered a bona fide 
possessor".138 Unfortunately, neither cites any authority on the point. 
Most writers, however, consider good faith to be a requirement.139 
 Reid denies that good faith is a requirement, holding that: 
 
 good faith is a consequence rather than a cause of a possessory 
 judgment, for a party who has obtained a possessory judgment is 
 deemed a bona fide possessor until such time as his title is 
 judicially set aside.140 
 
Unfortunately, he cites no authority in support of the proposition that 
good faith is not required. He does however, note the case Countess of 
Dunfermline v Lord Pitmedden,141 in which possessory judgment was held 
to be excluded on the basis that the possession was originally on a lease 
derived from the same title that the possessory judgment was sought to 
exclude. Reid argues that this case, "which appears to be an authority to 
the contrary [of the proposition that good faith is not required], may be 
                                       
135 (1876) 3 R 429. 
136 Stair, Inst. 4.26.10(7). 
137 Rankine, Landownership, p 12. 
138 Walker, Civil Remedies, p 252. 
139 Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, para 89; W M Gordon & S Wortley, Scottish Land 
Law, 3rd edn (London: W Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 1, 2009), para 14-20; 
Rankine, Landownership, p. 12; Dickson, Possessory Actions, para 1192; Cusine 
& Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way, paras 16.19 and 23.09. 
140 Reid, Property, para 146. 
141 (1698) Mor 10630. 
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explained on the basis of inversion of possession".142 No doubt it can. 
However, it is notable that the report of the case has the decision 
expressly based on a lack of good faith. The point about inversion of 
possession therefore appears to be merely a specific example of bad faith 
as a bar to the possessory judgment. 
 Reid also refers to a passage by Stair in which he says of those 
obtaining a possessory judgment that: 
 
 they do not only secure the profits they have made as bona fide 
 possessores, but may continue to enjoy the future profits, till they 
 be put in mala fide, by judicial production of a better right, by way 
 of reduction, declarator or competition.143  
 
As Reid observes, the word "as" here can be construed in one of two 
ways, being read either as meaning that the holder of the possessory 
judgment was in fact in good faith or that he is treated as if he was in 
good faith. Reid, not implausibly, considers the latter more likely. The 
point is an important one, because Stair does not otherwise anywhere 
directly address the question of whether good faith is needed for a 
possessory judgment. 
 However, there is good reason to think that Stair did in fact believe 
good faith to be required. At one point we find him talking about the use 
of a possessory judgment to protect use of land as if by servitude.144 He 
notes that, if use is left off for a time, the apparent owner of the land will 
be able to resist the use of the apparent servitude. He does not say, 
unfortunately, what length of time will have this effect, but as we have 
seen the possessory judgment is still available until seven years' non-
possession. It may be taken therefore that this period is the intended one. 
The apparent owner will then have had seven years' possession without 
the servitude being exercised, and so will himself be entitled to a 
possessory judgment. Stair, though, says that the reason he is entitled to 
a possessory judgment to resist the exercise of the servitude is that he 
has possessed "bona fide, without any such burden". The implication of 
this is that a possessory judgment is awarded not because one has 
possessed, but because one has possessed in good faith. 
 It is accepted that the possessory judgment is not available as a 
defence to claims based on debita fundi, payment obligations attached to 
the land.145  In the section immediately following the one referred to in 
the last paragraph,146 Stair says that the reason for this is that such 
obligations are made "notour" by infeftment. They will appear in the 
                                       
142 Reid, Property, para 146 n 4. 
143 Stair, Inst. 4.26.3, cited Reid, Property, para 133 n 5. The account here of the 
ways in which a person may be put into bad faith is consistent with Stair's 
general view that this normally requires litigation: Stair, Inst. 2.1.24. 
144 Stair, Inst. 4.17.2. 
145 Bankton 2.1.33; Adamsons v Lord Balmerino (1662) Mor 10645; Hadden v 
Moir (1673) Mor 10648. As we saw in Loch v Lockie, noted earlier, the possessory 
judgment can, however, be used for the enforcement of the debitum fundi itself 
(in that case, an annualrent). 
146 Stair, Inst. 4.17.3. 
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Register of Sasines,147 and so the public has notice of them. Of course, 
the same is true of claims based on titles of ownership, so it does not 
appear that Stair is correct here: the better view appears to be that given 
by Bankton,148 that the reason why the possessory judgment is not a good 
defence to a claim for a debitum fundi is that such a claim does not 
challenge the present state of possession. For present purposes, though, 
the point is that Stair's view appears to be based on the idea that the 
possessory judgment is not available as a defence where the possessor 
ought to have been aware of the contrary claim. In other words, only a 
possessor who is in good faith will be entitled to the possessory judgment. 
 It is suggested, therefore, that Stair does consider good faith to be 
a requirement for the possessory judgment. Supportive of this conclusion 
is the fact that he refers to the possessory judgment in his account of the 
rights of the possessor in good faith,149 giving as the only distinction the 
requirement with the possessory judgment for a longer period of 
possession.  
 Bankton too says that the possession must be "attained bona 
fide".150 There is also caselaw supportive of this view. For example, in 
Ross v Fisher,151 a party had obtained possession of an area of ground on 
the basis of a deed which stated that the ground was burdened by a 
servitude in favour of a third party. He then had the granter of that deed 
grant it anew without reference to the servitude, considering that the 
servitude had been included improperly. He then destroyed the original 
deed. He was denied a possessory judgment against the party asserting 
the existence of the servitude, apparently on the basis of bad faith. Lord 
Balgray said in that case: 
 
 as it is impossible to refer his possession of the ground in dispute 
 to any bona fide title, he cannot claim the benefit of a possessory 
 judgment.152 
 
 We saw earlier that one could not normally obtain a possessory 
judgment in the face of an earlier decree on the question of right. In two 
of the cases referred to there,153 the decisions as reported are expressly 
based on the possessor being put into bad faith by the earlier decree, 
going in fact beyond Bankton's view, and implying that good faith must be 
continued through the whole period of possession. 
 Finally, in Boyd v Kirkcudbright County Council,154 the sheriff 
expressly stated that good faith was a requirement. Indeed, he went so 
                                       
147 This is a public register of deeds relating to land, established by the 
Registration Act 1617. It is now being progressively replaced by a newer register, 
called the Land Register, created by the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979. 
The 1979 is itself prospectively repealed and replaced by the Land Registration 
etc (Scotland) Act 2012. 
148 Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33. 
149 Stair, Inst. 2.1.24. 
150 Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33. 
151 (1833) 11 S 467. 
152 (1833) 11 S 467 at 470. 
153 Montgomery v Home (1664) Mor 10627; Anderson v Forbes (1696) Mor 
10630. 
154 1937 SLT (Sh Ct) 17. 
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far as to suggest that the need for good faith was the reason why it was 
necessary to show an apparent title to the land.155 
 It seems clear, therefore, that good faith is a requirement. 
However, this is qualified by Rankine, who holds only that: 
 
 in a question between the possessor and him from whom it was 
 obtained or his authors, it must be bonâ fide possession.156 
 
If correct, it would explain why in Montgomery v Home157 possessory 
judgment was refused to the occupier of land following a decree of 
removing, but in Innes v Allardyce158 interdict was allowed against third 
parties even though the lease on which the possession was based had 
been reduced. This would also be consistent with the position in Roman 
law, in which it was only relevant that possession was obtained wrongfully 
in a dispute with the person from whom the possession was acquired.159 
However, there is no warrant in the authorities for holding the 
requirement for good faith to be restricted in this manner. In all 
authorities requiring good faith, there is no suggestion that the 
requirement is anything other than general. Indeed, the position is rather 
to the contrary. In Ross v Fisher and Boyd v Kirkcudbright County Council, 
the party seeking the protection of the possessory judgment was in 
opposition, not to his author or a predecessor in title, but to a successor in 
title to his author. Nor indeed was it even an immediate successor in title. 
This cannot be a special factor in these cases: in a feudal system of land 
tenure, if one traces title back far enough, two owners will inevitably have 
a common author. Added to this, in all authorities requiring good faith, 
there is no suggestion that the requirement is anything other than 
general. 
  On the other hand, it is a different question altogether whether 
good faith ought to be required. Arguably, the law is misguided in 
requiring good faith, as to enquire into that is to begin to enquire into 
matters that are not the concern of the court in purely possessory 
proceedings. It is notable that good faith is not required in proceedings for 
spuilzie or for acquisition of ownership by positive prescription. 
 
(8) Effect of a possessory judgment 
 
The general effect of a possessory judgment is that the holder's title is 
treated as valid unless and until court proceedings are successfully 
pursued for the reduction of that title.160 As we have seen, the possessory 
                                       
155 This is because the importance, noted earlier, of written titles means that a 
possessor without such a title could in the normal case never be in good faith as 
to the right to possess. 
156 Rankine, Landownership, p 11. See also Dickson, Possessory Actions, para 
1192. 
157 (1664) Mor 10627. 
158 (1822) 2 S 93. 
159 Paul, D.43.17.2. 
160 Stair, Inst. 4.22.14, 4.26.1.3; Ersk, Inst. 2.6.28, 4.1.50; Bankton, Inst. 
2.1.33; Pollock v Anderson (1663) Mor 10634. Rankine (Landownership, p 12) 
adds "or he is otherwise put in malâ fide", but this is not justified by his cited 
sources. 
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judgment is a possessory remedy, and so it is not permitted at that time 
to raise questions of right. Reid's statement, therefore, that the 
possessory judgment "gives rise to a presumption of validity of title which 
it is for a challenger to rebut",161 requires to be qualified if it is taken to 
suggest that that presumption is capable of being rebutted in the 
possessory proceedings. 
 As the possessory judgment has the effect of excluding any 
objections to the validity of the possessor's title in those proceedings, it 
may be used by either pursuer or defender. Examples in the sources 
include the possessory judgment being used as a defence to an action of 
removing,162 or for the recovery of possession,163 or by either party in an 
action for mails and duties.164 The possessory judgment also can be used 
to justify acts ancillary to the right to possession. For example, in Nelson's 
Trs v M'Caig,165 it was accepted that the award of a possessory judgment 
on a claimed servitude or public right of way would justify a neighbour in 
carrying out repair works on the road. 
 Stair does, however, give one exception to the rule that a 
possessory judgment may be used for the recovery of possession, in the 
case of leases. While seven years' possession on a lease is sufficient for 
the defence of possession, one who has possessed on a lease "cannot 
recover possession activè by a possessory judgment, as an infeftment 
may".166 Unfortunately, Stair gives no rationale for this limitation, which is 
not given by any other institutional writer. It is also contradicted by the 
decision in Little v Irving,167 in which a tenant was allowed to use the 
possessory judgment to recover possession, but in which this passage 
from Stair was unfortunately not cited to the court. 
 In the case of competing claims to ownership and a servitude over 
the same land, Stair says that the one possessing the land as apparent 
owner may have a possessory judgment until the servitude is established 
by declarator.168 Walker is surely correct, though, to say that the matter is 
different when the party claiming the servitude is himself entitled to a 
possessory judgment.169 In such a case, seven years' possession by the 
possessor of the land itself will be no defence to a claim for a possessory 
judgment by the party claiming the servitude.170 Indeed, were it not so, it 
is difficult to see how one exercising an apparent servitude could ever 
qualify for a possessory judgment unless the burdened property had been 
left unpossessed through the seven years. 
 As noted earlier, it is established that a possessory judgment is no 
defence against a claim for a debt attaching to the land.171 As we have 
                                       
161 Reid, Property, para 146. 
162 Stair, Inst. 4.26.10; Hope, Minor Practicks, X.1. 
163 Richmond v Inglis (1842) 4 D 769. 
164 Erskine 4.1.49; Stair 4.22.14, 4.22.16, 4.26.4; Bankton 4.24.49. 
165 (1899) 7 SLT 244. 
166 Stair, Inst. 4.22.16. 
167 Unreported, 25.1.2000, Dumfries Sheriff Court. 
168 Stair, Inst. 4.17.3. 
169 Walker, Civil Remedies, p 251. 
170 Porterfield v M'Millan (1847) 9 D 1424;  Drummond v Milligan (1890) 17 R 
316.  
171 Adamsons v Lord Balmerino (1662) Mor 10645; Hadden v Moir (1673) Mor 
10648. 
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seen, although Stair based this limitation on the need for good faith, 
Bankton's view seems preferable: for him, the reason that the possessory 
judgment is no defence in this case is that these rights do not give any 
right to possession of the land, and so do not involve any challenge to the 
existing possession of the land. They are therefore not relevant in 
possessory proceedings regarding that land.172 
 
C. SHOULD THE POSSESSORY JUDGMENT BE ABOLISHED? 
 
(1) Introduction 
 
The possessory judgment continues to be a competent remedy. In 
practice, however, it is now rarely if ever used. For the defence of 
possession, the general remedy of interdict is normally used (whether ad 
interim or permanent),173 full proof of right not being necessary for such a 
remedy.174 For recovery of possession of land, the normal remedies of 
removing and ejection175 are generally used.176 Indeed, so much have the 
possessory remedies been forgotten - not just the possessory judgment - 
that one writer was able to write a substantial account of the 
consequences of possession without mentioning them at all.177 
If a remedy provided by the law is rarely used, that raises the 
question of whether that remedy is needed at all. The view has certainly 
been taken that the possessory judgment should be abolished.178 Of 
course, it may be that a rarely used remedy still has value. It may be, for 
example, the only remedy provided in a situation where it is reasonable 
that a remedy should exist. For example, although spuilzie is a rarely used 
remedy, it is the only protection given to certain possessors, such as 
hirers of goods.179 It may also be found helpful where there is a genuine 
dispute over the scope of a conveyance from a larger area.180 
                                       
172 Bankton, Inst. 2.1.33. 
173 Reid, Property, para 145 n 10; W M Gordon & S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 
3rd edn (London: W Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 1, 2009), para 14-31; Dickson, 
Possessory Actions, para 1184. For full discussion of the remedy of interdict, see 
Scott Robinson, Interdict. 
174 Scott Robinson, Interdict, p 13; Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, para 149. 
175 This should not be confused with the possessory remedy of ejection, which is a 
response to the ejection of a possessor. Ejection in the present sense is an action 
seeking the removal of the current possessor. 
176 The distinction between ejection (in the sense meant here) and removing is 
broadly that the former is used where the possessor never had any right to 
possess. The latter is used when the possessor did at one time have such a right. 
See Reid, Property, para 153. 
177 R Sutherland, Possession in Scots Law: A Comparative Response in E Attwooll 
(ed), Perspectives in Jurisprudence (Glasgow: University of Glasgow Press, 1977). 
178 See e.g. W M Gordon in two commentaries on Watson v Shields (1994 SCLR 
826G-827A; 1996 SCLR 84F-G). 
179 C Anderson, "Spuilzie today" 2008 SLT (News) 257 at 260. Cf Scottish 
National Report, para 3.1.3(b). 
180 Matheson v Stewart (1872) 10 M 704. The court did not base its decision 
expressly on spuilzie, but clearly proceeds on the view that one recently 
dispossessed should be restored to possession until the question of right is 
considered. 
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The principle has been accepted in Scots law that possession of 
property gives rise to at least some limited protection until the question of 
right is considered. That principle is reflected in the possessory judgment. 
There is a problem, however, in that there are other procedures that will 
often provide the same result. 
 
(2) Protection of possession 
 
Insofar as the possessory judgment operates to prohibit interference with 
possession, it overlaps with the general remedy of interdict, which is an 
order from the court prohibiting some particular form of conduct. 
 When is interdict available to protect possession of land? There are 
four possible situations, depending on whether the possessor has an 
apparent written title and whether the challenger has an apparent written 
title.181 As the possessory judgment requires such a title, we need not 
detain ourselves with the cases where the possessor has no title. 
However, briefly, the rule seems to be that a possessor without title will 
only be entitled to interdict to protect that possession if the challenger 
also has no title.182 
 For cases in which the possessor does have a written title, 
Colquhoun v Paton183 is the leading case. In that case, Colquhoun had 
built piers on the shore of his land, and charged a fee to daily steam-
boats landing there, except on Sundays, when the piers were closed. He 
was held entitled to interdict against parties trying to use the piers on 
Sundays. Lord Cowan, giving the judgment of the court, laid down the 
test for interdict against interference with possession of land.184 First, he 
says, an apparent title must be shown. Second, either the challenger will 
have an apparent title or he will not. Where the challenger has no 
apparent title, interdict will be granted, provided the normal requirements 
for interdict are met. Where, on the other hand, both possessor and 
challenger have apparent titles, the party with seven years' possession 
will be preferred. 
 In other words, it is only in this specific situation, where both 
parties have an apparent title, that recourse to the possessory judgment 
is necessary for the defence of possession. Even then, possession for 
under seven years by a previous possessor may be enough to found an 
interdict, if the present possessor does not qualify for a possessory 
judgment.185 
 
                                       
181 This can obviously not apply in the case of real rights not requiring writing for 
their constitution, such as servitudes. For the requirements for interdict in such 
cases, see Scott Robinson, Interdict, pp 17-18. 
182 Irvine v Robertson (1873) 11 M 298 (challenger with no title: interdict 
granted); Watson v Shields 1996 SCLR 81 (challenger with apparent title: 
interdict refused). 
183 (1859) 21 D 996. See also London, Midland, and Scottish Railway Co v 
M'Donald 1924 SC 835. 
184 (1859) 21 D 996 at 1001. 
185 Stair, Inst. 4.26.10(7). 
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(3) Recovery of possession 
 
As we have seen, the possessory judgment may be used to recover 
possession. There is thus a potential overlap here with spuilzie. As spuilzie 
is intended for cases of recent dispossession, it seems appropriate to 
make a distinction on that ground. We shall consider first cases of 
recovery of possession following a recent dispossession, and then other 
cases of recovery of possession. 
 
(a) Recovery of possession following recent dispossession. We 
have seen that Scots law provides the remedy of spuilzie for cases of 
dispossession. One who is in possession is entitled not to be dispossessed 
and, if dispossession does occur, he is entitled to be restored to 
possession pending resolution of the question of right. This is intended to 
be a remedy for recent dispossession: formerly, the action had to be 
brought within three years of the dispossession.186  
 Where, then, does the possessory judgment fit in? It may be that 
the possessory judgment did not at first allow the recovery of possession: 
Hope, writing in the first half of the seventeenth century, considers 
spuilzie to be the appropriate remedy for dispossession,187 with the 
possessory judgment being only for the preservation of possession.188 
However, as we have seen, it is accepted that the possessory judgment 
may also be used to recover possession, with the advantage that it may 
be used for up to seven years of non-possession. 
 Concerning ourselves for the moment only with the recovery of 
possession recently lost, we may ask whether the possessory judgment is 
actually necessary. Thus, for example, we saw that in Macdonald v 
Watson189 one entitled to a possessory judgment to protect an apparent 
public right of way was held not to be liable to the landowner for 
demolishing a wall he had built across the road. This was based on 
possession for a period exceeding seven years. However, the outcome 
was the same in Graham v Sharpe,190 in which the facts were in effect 
identical except that, in the latter case, there had been only three years' 
possession. The remedy in this case seems clearly enough based on the 
general right of a possessor not to be dispossessed. 
 Again, we saw that, in Richmond v Inglis,191 a possessory judgment 
was granted to the effect of reversing a recent dispossession. In Matheson 
v Stewart,192 the outcome was the same even though the majority of the 
                                       
186 Act 1579, c. 81 (APS III, 145, c. 19). Johnston appears to be justified in 
arguing that, in the current law, the right to pursue an action for spuilzie 
prescribes in twenty years (D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation (Edinburgh: W 
Green, 1999), para 6.30), a rather surprising result for a remedy of this nature. 
He further argues (para 7.14) that this occurs under s 7 rather than s 8 of the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as the action for spuilzie is 
concerned with a right against the specific dispossessor rather than enforcement 
of a real right. 
187 Hope, Minor Practicks, X.3. 
188 Hope, Minor Practicks, X.1. 
189 (1830) 8 S 584. 
190 (1823) 2 S 540. 
191 (1842) 4 D 769. 
192 (1872) 10 M 704. 
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court took the view that the possessory judgment was inapplicable on the 
facts of the case. Instead, the decision was based on the principle that, in 
cases of disputed right, melior est conditio possidentis. As a result, the 
possessor was entitled not to be dispossessed pending resolution of the 
question of right. 
 It appears, therefore, that the possessory judgment is unnecessary 
in the reversal of recent dispossession, the issue being adequately dealt 
with already by spuilzie. More than this, though, the existence of remedies 
that overlap in this way has the potential to cause confusion. This appears 
in Dickson v Dickie.193 In this case, there was a dispute over an outside 
toilet adjoining subjects belonging to Dickie. Dickson was the owner of 
neighbouring land. Dickson dispossessed Dickie by changing the lock on 
the toilet door. Dickie sought a possessory judgment to compel Dickson to 
restore possession to him. Dickie had a written title, but was not yet 
infeft,194 and there was some discussion of whether this was a barrier to 
the granting of a possessory judgment. However, in the event, the court 
took the view that a possessory judgment was not the appropriate remedy 
anyway. The Lord Justice-Clerk, giving the leading opinion, said: 
 
 It seems to me very clear that the proper remedy of the petitioner 
 [Dickie] was not an interdict [i.e. a possessory judgment], but an 
 action of ejection, or rather an action of intrusion.195 
 
 The other judges concurred. The Lord Justice-Clerk appears here to 
proceed on the assumption that a possessory judgment is not available to 
bring about the restoration of possession, and that instead the possessory 
remedies are the possessory judgment to prevent dispossession and 
ejection or intrusion for the restoration of possession. As we have seen, 
this is not the accepted position.196 
 
(b) Recovery of possession otherwise. The same four possibilities 
exist here as with protection of possession, depending on whether the 
possessor has an apparent title and whether the party seeking possession 
has such a title. We are concerned here mostly with possession of land 
rather than of subordinate real rights. In the latter case, matters will 
normally proceed by way of action for interdict to prohibit exercise of the 
right.197 
 In the normal case, if the party seeking to recover possession has 
no kind of title, that will be an insuperable obstacle to success. The one 
exception to this arises where the possessor's title is derived from the 
challenger. As Stair says: 
                                       
193 (1863) 1 M 1157. 
194 I.e. his right had not yet been made real by infeftment. 
195 (1863) 1 M 1157 at 1161. 
196 The confusion is not limited to the court in this case. Despite what has been 
said, Mackay (Mackay, Practice I,200(b)) includes this case in his account of the 
possessory judgment, observing that it "was decided on the special circumstances 
of that case, and not of possessory judgment being competent without a title". 
The only "special circumstances" are that this is not a case of possessory 
judgment at all, according to the court. 
197 See e.g. Cusine & Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way, para 23.08 on 
interdict against interference with a public right of way. 
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If the possessor have been introduced by the pursuer, he cannot 
require any title for the removing at the pursuer's instance.198 
 
Thus, a squatter has sufficient title to remove a tenant deriving title from 
him.199 The reason for this, as Reid says, is that in such a case  
 
the validity of the title of the defender [i.e. the party in possession] 
necessarily supposed the validity of the title of the pursuer.200 
 
As a result, the defender cannot question the pursuer's title without 
questioning his own. 
 Where the party seeking possession has an apparent title and the 
possessor doesn't, the position appears to be that the party seeking 
possession will obtain it without having to prove the validity of his title. 
The leading case here is Mather v Alexander.201 In this case, the pursuer 
had an apparent title to an area of foreshore. He sought the ejection of 
the defender, a squatter, who had erected a temporary shelter there. The 
Court of Session, by a majority decision, held that the pursuer did not 
have to prove his title. Lord Hunter put it like this: 
 
There are cases where a pursuer, without necessarily having a title 
good against the world, may say to a defender, 'You, at all events, 
have no interest to dispute the title I produce, and to put me to an 
expensive proof of its validity'.202 
 
This opinion appears doubtful in principle. A title, meaning an apparent 
real right in the property, must be (to use Lord Hunter's words) "good 
against the world" or else no good at all. A title is not improved by 
recording in the Register of Sasines if it is invalid to start with.203 If it was 
the case that the pursuer's title was invalid, then he had no more right 
than the defender to possess the land. The Lord Justice-Clerk's dissenting 
opinion seems well founded: 
 
the Court is asked to take for granted an essential element of the 
pursuer's case.204 
 
The pursuer could have been awarded possession and then have it turn 
out that he had no right to possess after all. Nonetheless, the majority's 
                                       
198 Stair, Inst. 4.26.8. 
199 Chisholm v Chisholm (1898) 14 Sh Ct Rep 146. 
200 Reid, Property, para 144. 
201 1926 SC 139. 
202 1926 SC 139 at 148. 
203 This is because the principle nemo dat quod non habet applies in the Register 
of Sasines. This differs from the Land Register, in which the person registered as 
owner becomes owner by virtue of that registration: Land Registration (Scotland) 
Act 1979, s 3. The Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012, s 50 prospectively 
restores the common law position, subject to protections for good faith acquirers 
contained in s 86 of the 2012 Act. 
204 1926 SC 139 at 152. 
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opinion on the matter carries with it the authority of Stair,205 although the 
situation may be different if the defender is able to point to some specific 
defect in the pursuer's title,206 or alleges that the property is owned by a 
named third party.207 However that may be, though, the importance of 
this point for present purposes is that it is only where both pursuer and 
defender have apparent titles that the possessory judgment is relevant. In 
such a case, one seeking to recover possession has the option of either 
proving title or relying on the possessory judgment, proving seven years' 
possession on a title apparently valid and sufficient, not more than seven 
years in the past. 
 
(4) Reasons for abolishing the possessory judgment 
 
When considering whether the possessory judgment should be abolished, 
we must firstly note that it is of limited scope. As the law stands, the 
possessory judgment is not necessary in a case of recent dispossession, 
including recent interference with the exercise of a subordinate real right. 
Nor is it normally necessary in a case where one party has an apparent 
title and the other does not. 
 Of course, the limited scope of a remedy is not sufficient argument 
in itself for the abolition of that remedy. However, the extent of overlap 
between the possessory judgment and other remedies is likely to lead to 
confusion. Adequate remedies exist, even without the possessory 
judgment, to protect possession that is threatened and to allow the 
recovery of possession once lost. Given the existence of the general 
remedy of interdict, no great harm seems likely to result from the removal 
of the possessory judgment as a remedy for threatened acts or acts falling 
short of dispossession. This impression is reinforced by the apparent fact 
that this move to the use of the general remedy of interdict has happened 
anyway. 
 In cases of recovery of possession once lost, the existence of the 
possessory judgment seems to be a positive mischief. As we have seen, it 
has been stated that the law allows the benefit of the possessory 
judgment to survive for seven years of non-possession. Thus, in Maxwell v 
Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co,208 the owner of land sought to 
have removed certain works that were established by the defenders for 
railway purposes on his land a number of years previously. It was 
accepted by the court that, had these works been established within the 
previous seven years, the landowner would have been able to obtain a 
possessory judgment to the effect of having these works removed. It 
seems, however, rather startling that an individual should be allowed to 
stand by for - say - six years, and then require expensive works to be 
undone which, it may turn out, the other party was entitled to carry out 
after all. We have seen that there is a remedy for recent dispossession; 
where, by contrast, the dispossession happened at some much earlier 
time, it seems little hardship to require one disputing that possession to 
prove right. 
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(5) Reasons for retaining the possessory judgment 
 
Of all writers, only Gordon and Wortley209 provide any reason for retaining 
the possessory judgment, namely that it may be the only option to protect 
the possession of one with no completed title. Arguably, however, one 
who does not complete his title in the manner required by law does so at 
his own risk, and should not be protected from the results of his own 
carelessness. As has been said in a different context: 
 
however equity may afford relief, by undoing what has been 
illegally done, it cannot, in a question with third parties, supply the 
want of those things which, though required by the law, have been 
left undone.210 
 
There seems little reason, therefore, to retain the possessory judgment in 
the interest of those who do not look to their own interest. 
 The only other argument for retaining the possessory judgment 
appears to be that, in the case of a person exercising an apparent 
servitude, often use over an extended period of time will be the only way 
of distinguishing such a person from a casual trespasser. However, to 
require seven years' use appears excessive for this purpose. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is not intended here to deny the usefulness of possessory remedies. 
Rather, the problem is that Scots law appears to have a surplus of 
remedies for possessory situations. In addition to the possessory 
judgment, there is for recovery of possession the remedy of spuilzie, and 
for the protection of possession the general remedy of interdict. Some 
simplification seems possible. Given that it appears alternately to over-
protect (in allowing one to recover possession for up to seven years) and 
under-protect (in requiring possession for seven years before it is 
available), the possessory judgment seems the obvious candidate for 
removal. 
 
  
 
                                       
209 W M Gordon & S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn (London: W 
Green/Thomson Reuters, vol 1, 2009), para 14-32. 
210 Salter v Knox & Company's Factor (1786) Mor 14202 at 14203. 
